



Until the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the contract
clause,' because of its absolute prohibition of state impairments of
contractual obligations, was the most important constitutional re-
2straint on state power. During the twentieth century, however, the
United States Supreme Court softened the clause's rigid prohibition by
holding that state legislation may constitutionally impair contractual
obligations if the legislation "is addressed to a legitimate end and the
measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end."3 The
Court applied this test with almost complete deference to a state leg-
islature's discretion.4
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey5 marks a radical departure from the deferential ap-
proach to the contract clause that had prevailed since the 1930's. The
United States Trust majority6 held that a state's impairment of its own
contractual obligations will be struck down unless it is both "reason-
able and necessary to serve an important public purpose."7 Under this
test, an impairment may be "reasonable" if it deals with circumstances
that were unforeseen at the time of the making of the contract,' and
"necessary" if it achieves the state's asserted interest through the least
restrictive means.9
The standard of review promulgated in United States Trust may
revitalize the contract clause as an important limitation on state
power. It is the purpose of this Case Comment to discuss this new
constitutional test and its potential impact on future contract clause
litigation.
I. U.S. CONsT art. I, § 10: "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts ...
2. Until late in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court dealt more frequently with
contract clause issues than with any other constitutional provision except the commerce
clause. See B. WIGrT, THE CO'TRACT CLAUSE OF THE CoNsTrtrToI 91-92 (1938).
3. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934).
4. See notes 32-49 and accompanying text infra.
5. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
6. United States Trust was a 4-3 decision. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens and Chief
Justice Burger joined Justice Blackmun's majority opinion. Justices White and Marshall
sided with Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion. The Chief Justice also wrote a brief con-
curring opinion. Justices Stewart and Powell took no part in the decision.
7. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
8. Id. at31.
9. Id. at 30.
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
A. Early Interpretation of the Clause
The framers of the Constitution adopted the contract clause pri-
marily to protect creditors from state legislation that enabled debtors
to liquidate their private debts by tendering worthless property or de-
preciated paper money.'0 This express limitation on state action was
apparently motivated by the economic self-interest of the framers.
most of whom were vested property owners and desired "to shield
themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and
strong passions to which men are exposed."'"
To carry out the intent of the framers and to encourage the growth
of commerce, the Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century con-
strued the contract clause according to its literal meaning.'" Most of
the Justices in Ogden v. Saunders adhered to the principle that state
legislation may never impair an existing obligation.1
3
While the contract clause prohibited legislative impairment of a
contract's "obligation," it was interpreted to permit alteration of the
"remedy" for breach of contract.' 4 Modification of a remedy was
thought to be constitutional because the remedy was merely the
means of enforcing an obligation, rather than part of the obligation
itself. In Sturges v. Crowninshield,'5 for example, the Court found
permissible a legislative discharge of a debtor's imprisonment for de-
fault upon a debt. Imprisonment, the "remedy" for breach of the loan
agreement, was seen as distinct from the "obligation" to repay the
principal: "Imprisonment is no part of the contract, and simply to re-
lease the prisoner does not impair its obligation."' 6  Frequently,
however, "remedy" and "obligation" were so intertwined that a stat-
10. See Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARv L, RI.v 512,
512 (1944). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961) which con-
tains a statement by Madison that the contract clause would help "banish speculations
on public measures, inspire a general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the
business of society." Id. at 319.
11. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
12. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354-55 (1827) (Marshall, C.J,,
dissenting), cited with approval in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
427-28 (1934). Chief Justice Marshall felt the contract clause was designed to insure the
free flow of commerce and the existence of credit. See generally Hale, supra note 10, at 12.
13. Although a majority of the Ogden Court rejected the idea that the contract clause
applies to modifications of contracts formed after the passage of a statute, almost all the
Justices agreed that the contract clause absolutely prohibited statutes impairing current
obligations. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 335 (1827) (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting): "a State is as entirely forbidden to pass laws mpairing the obligation of
contracts, as to make treaties, or coin money." Unlike the ma ority of Justices, however,
Chief Justice Marshall wanted this rigid prohibition to be us~d for prospective impair-
ments of contract.
14. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200-01 (1819).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 201.
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ute purporting to modify only the remedy for breach of a contract also
impaired the contract's obligation. 17  When the alteration of a remedy
diminished the value of a contract, the Court held that an obligation of
the contract had also been impaired. 18
During the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court also broadened
the class of contracts to which the contract clause applied. Although
the framers apparently intended the contract clause to apply only to
contracts between private individuals (private contracts), 9 the Court
construed the clause expansively to apply to contracts entered into by
a state (state contracts). In Fletcher v. Peck Chief Justice Marshall,
applying the contract clause to a state land grant, stated that the words
of the clause "are general, and are applicable to contracts of every
description. ' 20
B. The Reserved Powers Doctrine
In contrast to the Marshall Court's stringent application of the
contract clause, under which many state statutes were invalidated,2'
the Court in the latter half of the nineteenth century interpreted the
clause to permit statutory modifications of contracts under the doctrine
that a state could not bargain away certain police powers, such as
the power to regulate the public health or morals.22  The notion was
not that the obligation of contracts giving up the right to exercise
these police powers could be impaired by subsequent legislation, but
rather that such contracts were invalid ab initio. Thus, the Court in
the leading case of Stone v. Mississipp2 3 held that the state legislature,
in outlawing lotteries, did not impermissibly impair a twenty-five year
lottery charter granted by its predecessor because no legislature could
bind its successor to a contract that bargains away the power, neces-
sarily reserved to the state, to regulate the public morals.
17. See, e.g., Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (I How.) 311 (1843), in %hich Illinois
altered existing remedies for default on mortgage contracts by prohibiting any default sale for
less than two-thirds of the property's appraised value. The Court invalidated this statutory
provision, holding that it also impaired the contract's obligation. Said the Court: "It is true that
this law apparently acts upon the remedy, and not directly upon the contract. Yet its effect is to
deprive the party of his preexisting right to foreclose the mortgage by a sale of the premises, and
to impose upon him conditions which would frequently render any sale altogether impossible."
Id. at 320.
18. Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301 (1848). See also Von Hoffman v. City
of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 555 (1867); Hale, supra note 10, at 542.
19. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 15-16.
20. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137 (1810). See also Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). (Corporate charter held to be a contract.)
21. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810).
22. See cases collected in B. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 203-13. Additionally, police
power to regulate public safety, public streets, and rivers was inalienable and could not be
bargained away. Id.
23. 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
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A state could, however, permanently bargain away its power to
regulate financial matters. The growth of the reserved powers doctrine
did not abrogate the Court's earlier holding that a state may grant a
permanent tax exemption.24 According to the Court, regulation of the
public health and morals was a primary function of state government;
taxation, however, was "incident to the exercise of the legitimate
functions of government, but nothing more."
25
C. Blaisdell and the Reasonableness Test
The reserved powers doctrine was arguably consistent with the
principle that no legislation may impair an existing obligation; con-
tracts bargaining away the power to regulate the public health or
morals were considered to be invalid ab initio, and thus not contracts
in the constitutional sense. In the twentieth century, however, the
Court began to permit certain "reasonable" impairments of con-
tractual obligations. Home Building & Loan Associaion v. Blaisdell,26 a
Depression-era case, was the first major decision in which the Court
expressed this reinterpretation of the contract Clause. Appellant in
Blaisdell had validly foreclosed appellee's mortgage and purchased the
mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale. A subsequent Minnesota
statute extended the period during which appellee could redeem his
land. The Supreme Court held that this legislative alteration of the
private contract did not violate the contract clause. The Court did not
base its decision on the remedy-obligation distinction, for under that
doctrine it had ruled that an act extending the period of redemption
impaired the obligation of a contract. 28  Rather, the prohibition of the
contract clause was judged "not an absolute one and [was] not to be
read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula. 29
The constitutional standard under which the Minnesota statute
in Blaisdell was sustained required that the retroactive "legislation
[be] addressed to a legitimate end and the measure taken [be] reason-
able and appropriate to that end."30 Under this standard, the Court
24. New Jersey v. Wilson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
25. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1880).
26. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
27. Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905), had hinted rearly thirty ycar before
Blaisdell that a valid obligation may be impaired to promote the general welfare. Justice
Johnson had been the first member of the Court to espouse the theor, that the contract clause
prohibition is not absolute. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (Johnson, J., dis-
senting).
28. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (I How.) 311 (1843). The Court in Bronson invalidated
a statutory provision that lengthened the mortgagors period of equitable redemption by a year.
The Blaisdell Court did not explicitly overrule Bronson, but attempted to distinguish it,
stating that the statute struck down in Bronson more oppressively abridged mortgagee rights
than the statute upheld in Blaisdell. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
432 (1934).
29. 290 U.S. at 429.
30. Id. at 438. The Court has used a similar standard of review when examining state
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determined the statute's reasonableness by balancing two competing
considerations: the strength of the state's interest, and the nature of
the private right and the extent of its deprivation. 3' As it conducted
this balancing process the Court paid great deference to the Minne-
sota legislature's determination of reasonableness. 3
2
The Court in Blaisdell found that the statute served the legitimate
public purpose of substantially enhancing the state's economic wel-
fare in a time of emergency, an especially weighty interest. 33 The
Court determined that the private right altered was insignificant be-
cause most of the main obligations of the mortgage agreement were
left intact.34 The obligations to pay interest and to fulfill all other con-
ditions of the contract were unchanged; only the redemption period
was affected. The Court further found that the Minnesota statute did
minimal damage to the mortgagee's rights.35 A mortgagor who re-
mained in possession was required to pay reasonable rent during the
extended redemption period. Moreover, the statute, which expired
after two years or the cessation of the emergency, provided merely
temporary and conditional relief
3 6
The Court applied the Blaisdell reasonableness test extremely de-
ferentially to validate state statutes that were not enacted under emer-
gency conditions or temporary in nature. 37 The Court struck down leg-
islation only if it (1) furthered "no discernible public purpose'; 38 (2)
was neither temporary nor conditional in its effect; 39 or (3) deprived
the private interest to a degree that undermined "the quality of an
acceptable investment for a rational investor. ' 40 In Faitoute Iron &
Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,4' the Court upheld a New Jersey
statute, enacted during the Depression, that permitted municipalities
economic legislation under the equal protection and due process clauses. See. e.g., City of
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), upholding an economic regulatory ordinance.
The Dukes Court stated that its decisions under the equal protection clause "require only that
the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id. at 303.
31. 290 U.S. at 444-47. See generally Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitu-
tionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV L. REv 692, 697 (1960).
32. "Whether the legislation is wise or unwise as a matter of policy is a question with
which we are not concerned." 290 U.S. at 447-48.
33. Id. at 444-45.
34. Id. at 445.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 447.
37. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 33 (1940) (upholding a statute
that permanently changed building and loan association withdrawval procedures); Honey-
man v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939) (sustaining a nonemergency statute that denied mort-
gagees deficiency judgments); East New York Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945) (valida-
ting legislation that repeatedly suspended a mortgagees right of foreclosure upon default).
38. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 196 (1936) (invalidating a Louisiana
statute that benefited a small number of private building and loan associations).
39. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426,434 (1934).
40. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935).
41. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
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permanently to alter the rights of their creditors if creditors repre-
senting at least eighty-five percent of the affected indebtedness con-
sented to the modification. Such an arrangement was effected for
Asbury Park, an insolvent municipality, when holders of its obliga-
tions agreed to exchange their bonds for new bonds that bore a lower
interest rate and had a later maturity date. The Court sustained the
legislation because the refunding scheme was part of a comprehensive
strategy to sustain the insolvent municipality both governmentally and
financially. 42 The new bonds had greater market value than the old
bonds.
43
In City of El Paso v. Simmons, 44 the most recent contract clause
case to reach the Supreme Court prior to United States Trust, the
Court sustained a Texas statute under the Blaisdell reasonableness
standard. A prior Texas statute had allowed purchasers of state
school land an unlimited time to reinstate their rights to the land if
they defaulted in the payment of the purchase price. In 1941 the leg-
islature reduced the reinstatement period to five years, thereby modi-
fying an existing contractual obligation. The Court determined that the
statute served a vital state interest because it removed clouds on the
title to school lands and thus helped to provide maximum revenue in
funding public education. 45 The El Paso Court upheld the 1941 leg-
islation. The Court found little injury to bona fide purchasers of
school lands; the unlimited reinstatement provision was not the primary
consideration for their agreements to purchase."6  Moreover, the
statute eliminated unforeseen benefits that had accrued to land specu-
lators.47  After substantial mineral wealth was found to exist on much
of the school land some purchasers remained in prolonged default
until minerals were discovered on their tracts and only then reinstated
their rights. The reduced reinstatement period discouraged this specu-
lation without burdening most purchasers because it allowed "de-
faulting purchasers with a bona fide interest in their lands a reason-
able time to reinstate. 48  The Court said that "[flaws which restrict
a party to those gains reasonably to be expected from the ontract are
not subject to attack under the Contract Clause., 49
The Court in the Blaisdell-El Paso line of cases departed from
the principle that legislation may never impair a contractual obliga-
tion. Although the language of its opinions sometimes indicated
42. Id. at 513.
43. Id. at 504.
44. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
45. Id. at 515.
46. Id. at 514.





otherwise,50 the Court applied a deferential reasonableness test under
which modifications of both private and state contracts were upheld
if they furthered some public welfare objective and did not signifi-
cantly impinge upon private contract rights. The majority in United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey5 has not totally disallowed impair-
ments of contractual obligations but has fashioned a much more strin-
gent test to determine the constitutionality of such impairments.
III. THE COURT'S DECISION IN United States Trust
A. Facts and Holding
The controversy in United States Trust centered on the altera-
tion of Port Authority bondholders' rights. The Port Authority was
created in 1921 by a bi-state compact between New York and New
Jersey. Although the compact gave the Authority "full power and
authority to purchase, construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or
facility within said district,"52 a comprehensive plan adopted shortly
thereafter directed the Authority to deal solely with the commercial
needs of the Port of New York and not with passenger traffic in the
Authority's district.53 To finance its projects, the Authority raised
funds primarily by issuing bonds to private investors.54
After several unsuccessful attempts to involve the Authority in
mass transportation, New York and New Jersey determined in 1960
that the Authority should acquire and operate the Hudson & Manhattan
Railroad, a bankrupt mass transit link between the two states.55 Be-
cause the Authority's entrance into mass transportation was expected
to be unprofitable and thus discourage investment in bonds, the New
York and New Jersey legislatures in 1962 covenanted with each other
and with the holders of any affected bonds to limit the subsidization of
rail passenger transportation from Authority revenues and reserves.56
The Authority was allowed to acquire self-supporting passenger rail-
road facilities or facilities that would not produce deficits over a per-
mitted amount.57  This statutory pledge of fiscal responsibility opened
the way for Port Authority involvement in mass transportation.
50. See text accompanying notes 85-87 infra.
51. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
52. Act of Apr. 7, 1921, ch. 151, 1921 NJ. Laws 412; 417 (NJ. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-7 (West
1963)); Act of Apr. 2, 1921, ch. 154, 1921 N.Y. Laws 492,497 (N.Y. UNco.soL. LAws § 6407 (Mc-
Kinney 1961)).
53. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 5 (1977).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 9-10.
56. Act of Feb. 13, 1962, ch. 8, § 6, 1962 N.J. LaAs 35; Act of March 27, 1962, ch. 209,
§ 6, 1962 N.Y. Laws 980.
57. 431 U.S. at 10-11. The annual estimated deficit, including the debt service, of
these facilities could not exceed one-tenth of the Authority's general reserve fund or one per-
cent of the Authority's total bonded debt. Id. at 11.
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In 1972 the New York and New Jersey legislatures, seeking to in-
crease Port Authority participation in mass transit, made the 1962
covenant inapplicable to bonds issued after the effective date of the
1972 legislation. 58  During the 1974 energy shortage59 the legislatures
of both states retroactively repealed the 1962 covenant. 60  The effect
of this action was to remove the protection that the covenant had pro-
vided to existing bondholders and allow the Port Authority to purchase
mass transit systems that incurred deficits greater than the amounts
permitted by the 1962 covenant.
Appellant United States Trust Company, a holder of and trustee
for Port Authority bonds, alleged that the 1974 New Jersey legisla-
tion violated the contract clause by unconstitutionally impairing the
obligation of its covenant with New Jersey. The Superior Court of
New Jersey, 61 the New Jersey Supreme Court affirming, 6 held that
the 1974 legislation was a reasonable exercise of the state's police
power and did not violate the contract clause. By a four to three vote,
the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the repeal
legislation unconstitutionally interfered with the 1962 covenant be-
cause it "was neither necessary to the achievement of the [state's] plan
nor reasonable in light of the circumstances.
63
Although it conceded that the mass transit, energy conservation,
and environmental protection goals of the New Jersey legislation were
"important and of legitimate public concern,"64 the United States Trust
majority maintained that total repeal of the 1962 covenant was not the
least restrictive way to attain these goals. 65 The state's objective of
"discouraging automobile use and improving mass transit" could have
been achieved by a less drastic modification of contract rights or
through alternative means that required no impairment of contract
rights at all.66 The majority hypothesized several less drastic means to
achieve New Jersey's mass transit plan. The legislature could have
modified the formula for computing "permitted deficits" or relaxed
the procedures for obtaining bondholder consent to use Authority
revenues for mass transit. 67  Alternatively, the legislature could
have diverted revenues from future increases in bridge and tunnel tolls
58. Act of Dec. 28, 1972, ch. 208, 1972 N.J. Laws 795; Act of June 8, 1972, ch, 1003,
1972 N.Y. Laws 3900 as amended by Act of May 10, 1973, ch. 318, 1973 N.Y. Laws 1121.
59. 431 U.S. at 13-14.
60. Act of April 30, 1974, ch. 25, 1974 N.J. Laws 53; Act of June 15, 1974, ch, 993, 1074
N.Y. Laws 2579.
61. 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (1975).
62. 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976).
63. 431 U.S. at 29.
64. Id. at 28.
65. Id. at 29-30 & nn.28 & 29.
66. Id. at 30.
67. Id. n.28.
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to mass transportation and left the rest of the covenant intact. 6
Moreover, the state could have accomplished its transportation ob-
jectives by legislating gas, parking, and other taxes.69 Because the
state could have employed these less restrictive alternatives, the
majority concluded that repeal of the covenant was not necessary.
The majority also determined that repeal of the 1962 covenant
was not reasonable because, unlike the law in El Paso, it was not
motivated by a desire to address changed circumstances that were
unforeseen at the time the contract was formed.70 The contemporary
need for mass transportation in the New York metropolitan area and
concern for the environment and energy conservation were foresee-
able: "It was with full knowledge of these concerns that the 1962
covenant was adopted. Indeed, the covenant was specifically intended
to protect the pledged revenues and reserves against the possibility
that such concerns would lead the Port Authority into greater involve-
ment in deficit mass transit."'
B. The Court's Analysis
The United States Trust majority produced h "novel 72 standard of
review for contract clause cases. Impairments of both private and
state contractual obligations must be both reasonable and necessary;
that is, the legislation must be (1) addressed to changed circumstances
unforeseeable at the time the contract was formed-the reasonableness
requirement;7s and (2) the least restrictive means of accomplishing an
important state purpose-the necessity requirement. 4 The majority
announced that it would continue to defer to legislative determinations
that modifications of private contracts are reasonable and necessary,
75
but asserted that the Court would not defer to such determinations for
state contracts. 6
68. Id.
69. Id. at 30 n.29.
70. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
71. 431 U.S. at 31-32.
72. See id. at 53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 31.
74. Id. at 29-31.
75.
Legislation adjusting the rights and responsibilities of [private] contracting parties must
be upon reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the public purpose
justifying its adoption. ...As is customary in reviewing economic and social regu-
lation, however, courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and
reasonableness of a particular measure.
Id. at 22-23.
76. "[C]omplete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is
not appropriate [when dealing with state contracts) because the State's self-interest is at stake."
Id. at 26.
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1. The "Reasonable and Necessary" Test77
In previous constitutional litigation, the use of reasonableness
and necessity in the same test would have been redundant because
necessity implied the most stringent standard of review of state
action, while reasonableness connoted relaxed judicial scrutiny.
Thus, a statute that satisfied the necessity test was, a fortiori, reason-
able."' The United States Trust majority escaped this redundancy,
however, by adopting a new definition of reasonableness.
In United States Trust the Court attempted to distinguish earlier
cases and to select language from previous opinions to support its new
constitutional standard. Although the Court had never used this two-
pronged test of constitutionality to decide contract clause litigation,
each of the prongs has some support in the prior case law.
In several Depression-era cases8 the Court applied a foresee-
ability criterion to uphold legislation favoring mortgagors when un-
foreseen market conditions resulted in unexpected hardships. More
recently, the Court in El Paso formally adopted foreseeability as a
criterion of reasonableness. In El Paso, the Texas legislation altering
the rights of purchasers of school lands was upheld partly because
it prevented purchasers from acquiring windfall profits. The Court
emphasized that laws "restrict[ing] a party to those gains reasonably
77. Before it applied its reasonable and necessary test, the majority in United States
Trust made a preliminary determination that repeal of the 1962 covenant had impaired a con-
tractual obligation. The Court easily concluded that the covenant constituted a contract
among New Jersey, New York, and the holders of the consolidated bonds. Id. at 17-18. More-
over, the majority held the contract to be valid when tested under the police power exception,
which forbids a state to bargain away such essential attributes of its sovereignty as the power
to regulate public health or morals. Id. at 23-24. While it realized that formalistic distinc-
tions among the various powers of the state perhaps cannot be dispositive, the Court nonethe-
less found the 1962 covenant to be valid because it dealt with a financial obligation that "as a
threshold matter may not be said automatically to fall within the reserved powers that cannot
be contracted away." Id. at 23-24. The majority in United States Trust also held that repeal
of the covenant constituted an impairment of an obligation because an important security pro-
vision was eliminated; the bondholders' expectations were seriously disrupted. Without reviving
the outdated remedy-obligation distinction, the Court distinguisled impairments that upset
significant bondholder expectations from impairments that caused no such subversion of ex-
pectations. Id. at 19 n.17. To make this determination, the majority examined the nature of the
impairment: "[a]s a security provision, the covenant was not superfluous; it limited the Port
Authority's deficits and thus protected the general reserve fund from depletion." Id, at 19,
Thus, the impairment provoked scrutiny under the contract clause. The issue of actual financial
loss to the bondholders was deemed unimportant since New York and New Jersey had not at-
tempted to compensate them for the taking of the covenant, a form of property. Id. at 19.
78. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), in which the Court
applied a stricter standard of review to state infringements of the right of interstate travel;
such legislation is unconstitutional "unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest." (emphasis in original).
79. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). The Court applied
the rational relation test to an economic regulation: "it is for the legislature, not the courts,
to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the ... requirement,"
80. See 431 U.S. I at 54-55 n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. See Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941); Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306
U.S. 539 (1939).
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to be expected from the contract" are immune from contract clause
attack. 82 The El Paso Court, however, used foreseeability as only one
part of its reasonableness test, which balanced the state interest
furthered against the private right denied. The Court also examined
the strength of the state interest and inquired whether the provision
affected was a "primary consideration for the buyer's undertaking. '"
The United States Trust majority refused "to engage in a utilitarian
comparison of public benefit and private loss."' 4  It looked solely at
foreseeability to determine reasonableness as it defined that term.
Unlike the El Paso test, under which foreseeability is but one aspect of
reasonableness, the United States Trust test would invalidate a statute
impairing a contractual obligation, regardless of the strength of the
state's interest, unless the impairment is necessary to deal with unfore-
seen circumstances.
The Court had previously hinted at a necessity requirement. In
El Paso, for example, the Court asserted that the reduction of rein-
statement rights was "quite clearly necessary" for administration of
the school lands85 because Texas' previous attempts to attain this
objective through other methods had proved unsuccessful. 6 Although
it acknowledged the necessity of legislation to alter reinstatement
rights, the Court in El Paso did not make necessity a requirement of
constitutionality under the contract clause, nor did it inquire into less
restrictive means of achieving Texas' public objective. The Court's
discovery that the limitation on reinstatement rights was essential
merely bolstered the Court's conclusion that the Texas legislation was
reasonable.8
7
The United States Trust test presents several problems. First, the
test does not take into consideration the extent of the damage to the
bondholders, but requires only a finding of a "technical impairment"
to trigger close scrutiny.8 8 Under this standard, elimination of a
single security provision in the 1962 covenant and total destruction
of the contract would both be accorded the same protection. The
United States Trust Court's refusal to examine the extent of the pri-
vate deprivation clearly assures adequate protection for contract
rights; even a de minimis invasion of private rights might be struck
down under the new standard. The cost of such protection, however,
82. 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965).
83. Id. at 514.
84. 431 U.S. at 29.
85. 379 U.S. at 516.
86. Id. at 512-13.
87. The Court found the Texas statute reasonable because "(t]he measure taken to in-
duce defaulting purchasers to comply with their contracts . . . was a mild one indeed.
hardly burdensome to the purchaser ... ., but nonetheless an important one to the States
interest." 379 U.S. at 516-17.
88. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21 (1977).
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is an inflexible standard of review that fails to distinguish among
different contractual modifications.
Second, the reasonableness standard, by focusing solely on
foreseeability, fails adequately to consider emergency conditions.
Emergencies, previously held to justify impairments of contract,89
are not taken into account in the new test unless they were unforesee-
able at the time of the making of the contract. Although the repeal of
the 1962 covenant was legislated to help remedy a fuel crisis, the
majority in United States Trust held the repeal unreasonable because
the emergency was, in its view, foreseeable at the time the contract
was formed.90 Most bond contract impairments could be struck down
under the majority's foreseeability criterion because bond interest
rates generally reflect the risk that the debtor will default as a result of
financial or other difficulties. In Faitoute, for example, the 1933 New
Jersey statute might have failed to satisfy the United States Trust
reasonableness standard because the parties to the contract could have
foreseen that the municipality would subsequently become insolvent.
Only in a rare case like El Paso, in which valuable minerals were un-
expectedly found on the purchaser's land, 9' will legislation that
impairs contract rights treat changes that were completely unforesee-
able at the time of contracting.
92
A third problem with the majority's test is that the "less re-
strictive alternative" standard will make it almost impossible for any
legislation that impairs contract rights to be sustained.9 3 The majority
89. See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asburi Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
90. 431 U.S. at 31-32.
91. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 511 (1965).
92. Assessing the very factors that the majority failed adequately to consider, the dis-
senters in United States Trust balanced the state's interest against the private right denied
and determined that the New Jersey legislation was reasonable. They found that the repeal
of the 1962 covenant furthered the goal of expanding mass transit and served the substantial
public interest of alleviating the energy crisis and urgent transportation and environmental
problems. 431 U.S. at 38 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Recognizing that the repeal might have
technically impaired the 1962 covenant, the dissent then looked to the extent of economic
injury and concluded that the repeal "occasioned only the most minimal damage on the part
of the Authority's bondholders." Id. at 41. The bond contracts still required periodic
payment of interest and repayment of principal when due; thus, the value of the bonds wa,
little affected by the repeal. Id. In addition, the Authority bondholders had two protection'
against deficit spending for mass transit apart from the 1962 covenant, First, under it "1.3
test" the Authority could not issue new consolidated bonds unless "the best one-year net
revenues derived from all of the Authority's facilities at least equal[ed] 130% of the pro-
spective debt service for the calendar year during which thc, debt service for all out-
standing and proposed bonds would be at a maximum." Id. at 34. Second, a "section 7 certi-
fication" provided that the Authority could not issue bonds unless it certified that the credit
standing of the Authority would not be impaired for a specified time period. Id. at 34-35.
93. Analysis of the majority's "less restrictive alternative" .tandard turns on how that
standard is defined. Traditionally the standard is that "an economic regulation violates due
process ...if the government can achieve the purposes of the challenged regulation equally
effectively by one or more narrower regulations." Struve, The Less-Restrictivc-AItcrntvte
Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV L. REv. 1463, 1,163 (1967). State legislation
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suggested means less drastic than total repeal of the 1962 covenant
to achieve New Jersey's mass transit plan. The Court's suggestions
included modifying the formula for computing "permitted deficits"
and easing the procedures for obtaining bondholder consent to use
Authority revenues for mass transit.94  At the same time, however,
the Court warned that even these "lesser impairments" could be found
unconstitutional under the necessity test.95  The majority also
suggested that New Jersey's plan could have been met without modi-
fication of the 1962 covenant if the legislature had taxed automobile
use, gasoline, or parking and applied the revenues to mass transit.
9 6
Almost all the statutes that have survived contract clause attack during
the past several decades would have been struck down under the
majority's new test. In El Paso, for example, Texas could either have
raised revenues for education by imposing more taxes or compensated
purchasers for loss of their unlimited reinstatement rights. 7
Less restrictive alternative analysis also makes little sense from a
standpoint of judicial competence. For forty years the Court has
deferred to legislative judgment in the area of socioeconomic regula-
tion, asserting that "it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance
the advantages and disadvantages" of such legislation."v It has been
suggested that the legislature as an institution is better equipped than
the judiciary to decide matters of socioeconomic regulation because
the Court has less ability to collect and synthesize detailed
empirical data and experiment with alternative programs."
Adoption of the majority's test would require the very inquiries
that the Court usually seeks to avoid. Properly performed, less re-
strictive alternative analysis would necessitate complex and burden-
some economic inquiry to determine whether legislation that modifies
contracts is necessary to achieve an important public objective. If,
is seldom invalidated under this standard because "in virtually every case involving real
legislation, a more perfect fit involves some added cost." Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analhsis.
88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1485 (1975). Although the United States Trust Court refers to the
traditional use of "less restrictive alternative," 431 U.S. at 30, it appears to have
adopted a "less restrictive alternative" doctrine that will fall harshly on state leg-
islation. The majority hypothesized means to achieve New Jersey's objectiv es less drastic
than repeal of the 1962 covenant but did not inquire whether the Court's alternatives %cre
as effective or as feasible as repeal. Thus used, "less restrictive alternative" analysis
could invalidate almost every state modification of contract rights since the Court can
easily postulate a means that is less burdensome to the private contracting party and
arguably serves the state's interest.
94. 431 U.S. at 30 n.28.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 30 n.29.
97. See id. at 59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
99. See Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function
of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.CL.A. L. REv. 689, 724 (1976).
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however, the Court fails to conduct adequate technical inquiries, state
legislation will be subject to arbitrary invalidation whenever the
Court hypothesizes an arguably less restrictive means.
Moreover, the majority's strict scrutiny of contract impairments-
imposed by its necessity test-does not comport with the Court's re-
laxed scrutiny of state socioeconomic regulation under other pro-
visions of the Constitution. The Court has consistently applied the
deferential reasonableness test to socioeconomic cases arising under
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Under this test, the Court will sustain any state socioeconomic
regulation that has some rational relation to a legitimate state
objective."' 0
2. State and Private Contracts: The Role of Deference
Yet another problem with the majority's teSt is its different treat-
ment of impairments of state and private contiacts.10 The majority
indicated that it would defer to legislative determination that a modi-
fication of a private contract was reasonable and necessary but not to
such a determination about a state contract.102
In other areas of constitutional litigation, necessity implies strin-
gent scrutiny of state legislation; deference is shown only where the
Court employs reasonableness or rational relationship test.'* Under
the majority's standard, the Court will require a state to show that
it is employing the least drastic means of altering- a private contract. 104
But when it examines modifications of private contracts, the Court
presumably will accept the state's determination of necessity without
further inquiry.
The majority found support for closer scrutiny of state contracts
in previous municipal bond cases. In W. B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh,'0 5 for example, a legislative modification affecting the
security of municipal bondholders was struck down because the leg-
islation had completely "taken from the mortgage the quality of an
acceptable investment for a rational investor."6 The majority in
United States Trust correctly recognized that this "total destruc-
100. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (D55). See also City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (overruling Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), the
only case in the last half century to strike down a wholly economic regulation on equal protec.
tion grounds).
101. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977).
102. Id. at 25-26.
103. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
104. 431 U.S. at 23, 26-27.
105. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
106. Id. at 60.
[Vol. 39:195
CONTRA CT CLA USE
tion'0 7 test represents "the outermost limits only";'0 the Kavanaugh
Court might have invalidated the statute even if there had been less
than total impairment of the contractual obligation. The majority in
United States Trust also pointed out that Faitoute, the sole case in
which a state's impairment of a bond contract has been upheld in this
century, involved only slight alteration of bondholder rights. In that
decision, the modification was made with the bondholders' approval
and in fact increased the market value of the new bonds. t 'W
Prior to United States Trust, however, the Court had never expli-
citly differentiated between impairments of state and private contracts
under the contract clause. The Court in Kavanaugh did not state that
its analysis would apply only to modifications of state contracts. The
Blaisdell Court did not preclude the possibility that its reasonableness
test would also apply to alterations of state contracts. Moreover, the
modifications of bondholder rights in Faitoute, contrary to the asser-
tion of the United States Trust majority, involved more than minimal
alteration of bondholder rights; the damage was arguably far more sub-
stantial than the interference with Authority bondholder rights because
"the reorganization plan both extended the maturity date of the city's
bonds by some 30 years and reduced the relevant coupon rate.""0
The legislation in Faitoute did enhance bond value, but the majority
itself asserted that valuation is an irrelevant criterion in determining
the constitutionality of impairment when the loss of contract rights is
not compensated."'
The El Paso decision" indicates that the deferential Blaisdell test
was applicable to alteration of state contracts.1 3  In that case, the
Court balanced the state interest advanced against the private right
deprived when ruling on Texas' unilateral imposition of a limited rein-
statement right on land purchasers. 14  Justice Black, the lone dis-
senter in El Paso, regarded the Court's decision as "balancing away"
the protection of the contract clause: "[T]he Court says that since the
State acts out of what this Court thinks are good motives, and has not
107. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
108. Id.
109. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 513 (1942).
See also Note, The Constitutionality of The New York Municipal Wage Free:e and Debt
Moratorium: Resurrection of the Contract Clause, 125 U. PA. L REv. 167, 200-09 (1976).
which lends support to the Court's thesis that the case- law gives a special status to
modifications of a state contract. Like the United States Trust majority, the Note dis-
tinguishes Faitoute from other bond contract cases because the state in that case did not
unilaterally alter its own obligations.
110. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 57 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I1. Id. at 19.
112. See text accompanying notes 44-49 supra.
113. Although the Court stated that the Texas statute was essential to achieve the state's
goals (see text accompanying note 85-87 supra), it proceeded to apply a deferential test.
114. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514-16 (1965).
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repudiated its contract except in a way which this Court thinks is
'reasonable', therefore the State will be allowed to ignore the Contract
Clause of the Constitution." '115
The "Gold Clause" cases decided under the fifth amendment pro-
vide the only historical basis for different treatment of legislative alter-
ations of private and state contracts. The Court upheld the impair-
ment of "gold value" clauses in private bond contracts,'1 6 but subse-
quently invalidated similar modifications of federal government
bonds." 7 The Court stated that "[tlhere is a clear distinction between
the power of the Congress to control or interdict the contracts of pri-
vate parties .. .and the power of the Congress to alter or repudiate
the substance of its own engagements.""' 8 The Court asserted that
parties who contract with the United States should always be able to
rely on the federal government's solemn pledge of creditworthiness
as more than a "vain promise."" 9 The Court seemed to imply that
contracting parties are entitled to place more reliance on the credit
of government than on the pledge of a private individual.
The United States Trust majority articulated its distinction be-
tween alterations of state and of private contracts. The Court main-
tained that deference to the state legislature's determination of reason-
ableness and necessity is not appropriate for modifications of state
contracts "because the State's self-interest is at stake."'' 20  It feared
that the contract clause would provide no protection whatever for in-
dividuals who contract with a state "[i]f a State could reduce its fi-
nancial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for what it
regarded as an important public purpose."'
2
'
This argument for lesser deference to alterations of state con-
tracts has merit. A state government presumably acts as a dis-
interested referee when it alters the rights of the parties to a private
contract. The government, however, cannot be expected to act with
such impartiality when its own obligations are at issue; "[t]here is
little reason to believe that the state, given the power to alter its own
contract obligations unilaterally, will act with more restraint than any
individual who is given the opportunity to escape the terms of an
onerous contract."'
122
The potential for abuse of the police power is a legitimate concern
but does not justify a distinction between alterations of state and pri-
115. Id. at 521 (Black, J., dissenting).
116. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
117. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
118. Id. at 350-51.
119. Id. at 351.
120. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
121. Id.
122. Note, supra note 109, at 189-90.
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vate contracts. The state is motivated by its self-interest when it
modifies private as well as public contracts. In Blaisdell, for example,
the Minnesota legislation that adjusted contract rights between
mortgagee and mortgagor was designed to preserve the public fisc.
Defaulting mortgagors might have been forced to turn to public assis-
tance; banks, left holding property for which there was no longer a
market, might have failed. It has been suggested that "[a]ll economic
regulations are promulgated at least in part because the government is
reluctant to use more expensive alternative means to effect the same
objective."' 23  Thus, in Blaisdell the legislature chose to abrogate
the mortgagees' rights rather than to purchase them.
Even if a state is more likely to abuse the police power when it
modifies its own contracts, close judicial scrutiny is not necessary to
prevent such abuse. The dissenters in United States Trust believed
that since the states' "credibility in the credit market obviously is highly
dependent on exercising their vast law-making powers with self-re-
straint and discipline . . . few if any jurisdictions would choose to
use their authority 'so foolish[ly] as to kill a goose that lays golden eggs
for them.' ,,124 States rely on private investment for many of their
projects; thus, they seek to preserve adequate bondholder rights in
order to encourage future investment. The political processes of a
state also reduce the probablility that a state will abuse its police
power. As the dissenters noted, the bondholders of some $300,000,000
in assets are neither "discrete" nor "insular" and are capable of
protecting their interests before the state legislature.1
25
Moreover, the majority's restrictive standard of review will limit
the scope of future state legislative action. 26 The framers, who ap-
parently intended the contract clause to apply only to private con-
tracts, 127 perhaps anticipated that successive generations of legislators




Until the United States Trust decision, the Supreme Court had
not used the contract clause to invalidate an impairment of a state con-
tract since the 1940's. 129 The majority's stringent scrutiny of the leg-
islative alteration of state contracts suggests renewed vitality for the
123. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 90 (1977).
124. 431 U.S. 1, 61 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Util.
Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394, 410 (1921)).
125. 431 U.S. at 62 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. See text accompanying notes 132-35 infra.
127. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 2 at 15-16.
128. See 431 U.S. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941) (striking down legislation that altered contracts
between Arkansas and purchasers of public land).
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clause. A state will have to show that its legislation is "reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose. ' ' 3U A maority of
the full Court, however, has not yet accepted the United States Trust
analysis. Had Justices Powell and Stewart participated in the deci-
sion, they might well have joined the dissenters to comprise a majority
that would have maintained a deferential philosophy toward leg-
islative alterations of all contracts.
31
The majority's standard, if it is not reexamined, will greatly
diminish the flexibility of state and city governments32 to combat
financial and other crises by modifications of obligations to in-
vestors. 33  During New York's recent financial crisis, the city council
and the state legislature each passed legislation designed to ease the
crisis. The city council authorized Mayor Beame to freeze the wages
of municipal employees, although union contracts called for cost-
of-living increases. The state legislature passed the Emergency
Moratorium Act that provided for a conditional three-year moratorium
on the enforcement of short-term obligations. 34 The New York lower
state courts employed the Blaisdell standard to uphold these leg-
islative impairments of contracts used to safeguard public welfare
during an emergency.' 35
The United States Trust majority might have invalidated both the
wage freeze and the debt moratorium. As a preliminary matter, the
majority would have little trouble finding impairments of contracts
in both pieces of legislation. Both modifications of contract rights
were probably unreasonable under the United States Trust stan-
dard because New York City's fiscal plight was arguably foreseeable
and the modifications conferred no unexpected advantages on the
bondholders or municipal employees. The wage freeze and debt
moratorium might have failed to satisfy the United States Trust
necessity test; although both laws furthered the public welfare, they
were not the least restrictive means to achieve the state's objectives.
Rather than impair the obligations of municipal bonds, New York City
could have discharged city employees. The state legislature could
have used its taxing power to provide additional funds for New York
130. 431 U.S. at 25.
131. Justice Stewart was a member of the El Paso majority, which employed the defer-
ential reasonableness standard to validate the modification of a state obligation.
132. The contract clause also applies to modifications by municipal ordinance. See
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914).
133. See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
134. See Note, supra note 109, at 167-68, for discussion of both the wage freeze and the
debt moratorium.
135. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379 N.Y.S.2d
978 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd 52 App. Div. 2d 84, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1976), rev'd on other grounds,
40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976); Subway Surface Supervisors Ass'n v.




City and avoided a debt moratorium. The majority's standard of re-
view, moreover, would fail to take account of the existence of emer-
gency conditions or the actual extent of the deprivation of private
contractual rights. Had the United States Trust standard of review
been in effect, New York City might arguably have been forced into
bankruptcy because the only less restrictive alternatives to the wage
freeze and the bond moratorium would not have been economically or
politically feasible.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority in United States Trust constructed its stringent
"reasonable and necessary" test to ensure that a state would not
renege on its financial obligations "simply because it would prefer
to spend the money to promote the public good rather than the pri-
vate welfare of its creditors."' 3 6 The test d,:-ives little support from
previous contract clause decisions and is not dictated by considera-
tions of judicial competence. Most critically, the majority's test could
interfere with effective operation of state and local government. New
York City weathered a potentially disastrous financial crisis because
it was able to alter contractual obligations with municipal bond-
holders and employees. The ability of cities and states to cope with
future emergencies will be greatly limited if the Court does not recon-
sider its decision in United States Trust.
Jordan Bleznick
136. 431 U.S. at 29.
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